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 1.  Introduction 
The extent to which subnational governments can independently choose their fiscal (and 
other) policies is a critical issue in any federation. In the United States, state governments enjoy a 
high but not unlimited degree of discretion in choosing their tax policies.  For instance, although 
many states have elected to impose taxes on retail sales, personal income, and corporation income, 
others have not.  Different states define taxable personal income, corporate income, and retail sales 
in different ways and subject these bases to taxation at different rates.  The tax policies chosen by 
counties, municipalities, school districts, and other local governments vary substantially among and 
within states.  These and other variations in state and local tax policies show that subnational 
governments in the United States possess substantial fiscal autonomy.  These governments are not, 
however, completely free to pursue whatever tax policies they wish.  In particular, state tax 
policies, and the tax policies of their subsidiary local governments, must respect fundamental 
constraints imposed by the US Constitution, as interpreted by the courts.  Furthermore, state taxes 
are sometimes also constrained by Federal statutes. The objective of the present paper is to examine 
such Federal statutory “pre-emption” of state taxation in general and to discuss some important 
specific instances in which current or proposed Federal statutes do (or may in the future) affect 
state tax policies. 
To start the discussion, Section 2 provides a concise overview of existing Federal statutes 
that regulate state tax policies.  It also explains some of the ways in which state tax policies are 
affected by non-statutory controls, including constitutional constraints. Section 3 discusses pre-
emption within the context of the economic analysis of federalism, comparing it with some of the 
alternative forms of control over state taxation outlined in Section 2. Section 4 analyzes the role of 
pre-emption in three important specific areas of state tax policy: retail sales taxation of remote 
  1vendors, the taxation of tax-sheltered retirement distributions under state personal income taxes, 
and limitations on the powers of the states to tax the incomes of corporations not located within 
their boundaries.  Section 5 provides a brief summary and conclusion.    
2. Constraints on Subnational Taxing Powers in the US Federation 
The taxing powers of state governments are subject to a number of important constraints.  
Some of the most fundamental of these derive from the Constitution.  Others are the result of 
Federal legislation. States may also act voluntarily to restrict their taxes, for example by 
coordinating their policies with other states.   
The Commerce Clause (Article 1, Section 8) authorizes Congress to regulate interstate 
commerce.  As interpreted by the courts, the Commerce Clause also means that states cannot 
“regulate” or interfere with interstate commerce.  The precise meaning of this “negative” or 
“dormant” commerce clause is the subject of continuing controversy, as illustrated recently by the 
case of DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno but generally it is widely understood to preclude explicit tariffs on 
interstate trade and other state policies that would similarly undermine free trade among the states.
1  
In addition to the Commerce Clause, the exercise of state taxing powers must also respect other 
constitutional requirements, including the right of due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.  
While the Constitution places some limits on state policies, it may also grant significant 
policy authority to the states, even if only implicitly.  It may do so, first, through the imposition of 
limits on the powers of the Federal government, potentially leaving some scope for the exercise of 
state authority.  Other constitutional provisions also appear to make at least some allowance for 
                                                 
1 See 126 S. Ct. 1854 (2006).  In this case, it was argued that the state of Ohio and the city of 
Toledo should not be permitted to use tax policy to encourage investment by DaimlerChrysler in a 
new plant.  The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed this particular case on technical grounds, but 
the fundamental issue seems likely to arise again in future litigation.  See Enrich (forthcoming) for 
a legal analysis of the issues in Cuno. 
 
  2nontrivial state powers.  In particular, the Tenth Amendment grants some rather ill-defined residual 
authority “to the states respectively, or to the people.”  Although judicial interpretations of the 
Commerce Clause, the Preamble (establishing the union of the states in order to “promote the 
general welfare”), and other constitutional provisions have diluted this residual authority over time, 
there nevertheless seems to be a general “presumption of innocence” with respect to state and local 
taxation, in the sense that “what is not prohibited is allowed.”  In practice, the states enjoy 
considerable “rate autonomy” in that they may freely raise or lower the rates of constitutionally 
permissible taxes, at least within wide boundaries.  Furthermore, they possess significant “base 
autonomy” in that they may elect or decline to utilize specific types of taxes (on retail sales, 
whether tangible or intangible, on business incomes, on real and personal property, on fuels, 
vehicles, and so forth).  Like the Federal government, they may generally define tax bases as they 
wish, as illustrated by the many state-specific adjustments that are commonly made to Federal 
adjusted gross income when determining taxable income for state personal income tax purposes.  
The states may also obtain revenues from a wide variety of nontax sources.  Indistinct though its 
boundaries may be, the residual taxing authority of the states granted by the Constitution evidently 
accommodates nontrivial diversity in state and local revenue structures.   
In addition to the fundamental limitations imposed by the Constitution, state taxing powers 
are constrained by Federal legislation.  The Federation of Tax Administators (FTA) (2005) 
provides a convenient inventory of Federal statutes regulating state taxation, identifying 28 separate 
laws that prohibit or restrain certain specific types of state taxation.  These statutes are quite 
diverse, but most can be characterized as pertaining to tax situations involving either “horizontal” 
(interstate) or “vertical” (Federal/state) intergovernmental fiscal interactions.   
  3The “horizontal” category includes statutes that affect the power of states to tax individuals 
or businesses whose activities have some multi-state dimension.  Several statutes govern state 
taxing powers for businesses or workers involved in interstate transportation or communications.   
For example, some of these statutes prohibit state sales/gross receipts or per-head taxes on 
businesses or consumers in airline, rail, and bus transportation.  Others insure that the incomes of 
transportation workers, whose duties may take them to several different states in the normal course 
of their employment, may be taxed only in their states of residence. All of these statutes have the 
effect of limiting the ability of states to impose taxes on activities directly involved in or closely 
related to interstate trade.  The 1998 Federal Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA) and its successor, 
the 2004 Internet Tax Nondiscrimination Act (ITNA), prohibit state governments from taxing 
internet access.  Since internet access facilitates interstate (and global) communication, these laws 
can be viewed in part as attempts to prevent states from imposing taxes that could interfere with 
such communication and with the interstate commerce that it may spawn.  
Other Federal statutes apply more generally to economic activities involving interstate 
commerce, rather than to specific industries linked closely to such commerce.  For example, Public 
Law 104-95, enacted in 1996, prevents states from imposing taxes on pension distributions and 
other deferred compensation received by former residents, such as households that move to other 
states upon retirement.  In the realm of corporate income taxation, Public Law 86-272, passed in 
1959, prevents a state from imposing taxes on the income of a corporation if its only connection 
with the state is that it sells tangible products there or solicits such sales.  These two statutes are 
discussed in more detail in Section 4 below.  
In addition to statutes that affect state taxation of multistate activities, there are laws that 
constrain their taxing authority with respect to Federal government resources and policies.  Several 
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Federal government.  For example, the incomes of personnel on a military base are subject to tax in 
their states of residence.  Other statutes limit the power of states to tax members of Congress or of 
Federal employees generally, the activities of government enterprises, and Federal Reserve Banks.  
Sometimes these laws provide for exemption from state taxation, whereas in other cases they 
impose uniformity or non-discrimination requirements that insure that Federal employees are not 
subjected to differentially high taxation.  Another Federal statute prohibits states from collecting 
sales taxes on food purchased using Food Stamps.  This statute insures that state taxes cannot 
impinge upon and possibly interfere with this Federally-financed program.  
Whereas the Constitution and Federal statutes may place limits on state taxes, states may 
also relinquish taxing powers voluntarily through participation in agreements with other states.  The 
Multistate Tax Compact (MTC) illustrates how such agreements can provide policy coordination 
mechanisms for the states when they so desire.  The MTC, established in 1967, came into effect 
upon its adoption by seven states, and it has by now a total of forty-seven participating states.
2  
Through the work of its Multistate Tax Commission, it facilitates common approaches to tax policy 
and administration, for example by promoting the familiar three-factor apportionment formula in 
the taxation of the income of multistate corporations.  Because participation in the MTC is 
voluntary, it does not restrict state tax policies as strictly as Federal statutes or the Constitution. As 
discussed in the next section, voluntary arrangements have both advantages and disadvantages 
relative to more binding forms of control over state tax policies.  
                                                 
2 The MTC was established partly in order to forestall Federal legislation which would likely have restricted state 
corporation income taxes more severely than PL86-272 (Multistate Tax Compact (1967)).  It seems to have succeeded 
in this respect, although recent proposed Federal legislation, discussed further in Section 4 below, reopens the issue.  
The interplay between Supreme Court rulings on corporate taxation, Federal legislative proposals, and the states that 
culminated in the founding of the MTC is discussed in Anonymous (1968). 
  5Although the present paper focuses on Federal statutes that affect state tax policies, it is 
worth bearing in mind that state constitutions and statutes define and regulate the taxing powers of 
local governments.  Limitations on local property taxation, of which Proposition 13 in California is 
a famous example, are found in many states.  Local governments in some states are authorized to 
collect taxes on the earnings of workers and on the profits of corporate and noncorporate 
businesses, whereas such taxes may not be permitted in other states.
3  In general, states may grant 
localities as much or as little “rate” and “base” autonomy as they wish – always subject, however, 
to oversight by the courts.  Indeed, judicial interventions in local taxation can be extremely 
significant; in many cases, court decisions have mandated state legislative action leading to major 
restructuring of school finance systems.  In one notable instance, a Missouri school finance case 
(Missouri v. Jenkins) led to a Federal judicial override of state constitutional limitations on local 
property tax rates, found to be incompatible with the court’s desired remedies for deficiencies in 
local schools (O’Leary and Wise, 1991).  As evidenced by the rich literature on the impacts of 
property tax limitations, state limitations on local taxes (and the court decisions that in some cases 
may have brought about these limitations) may have far-reaching and possibly unanticipated 
consequences, affecting not only local expenditures but also the division of financing and 
expenditure responsibilities between states and localities (Silva and Sonstelie (1995)).   
State control over local taxation is not examined further here, but this subject warrants 
further research attention.  As the above brief remarks show, judicial and statutory controls over the 
fiscal policies of local governments pervade the U.S. federal system and are by no means confined 
                                                 
3 Local taxation varies by state.  Kentucky’s system provides an interesting illustration.  In addition to property taxes, 
many but not all localities are permitted tax wage income and business net income, at rates that vary within specific 
limits, depending on the size and type of jurisdiction.  Taxes on property insurance premiums are an important revenue 
source for some localities.  Property tax rates can vary among localities but a state law limits the annual rate of growth 
of property tax revenues for most localities.  Proposed reforms of this system would necessitate a combination of state 
legislation and amendments to the state constitution. These and other intricacies are discussed in detail in the report of a 
recent Task Force on Local Taxation (see Wildasin (2007).  
  6to Federal government control over state government policies.  Systematic study of state-local 
statutory and constitutional fiscal regulation could shed significant light on the general federalism 
issue of higher-level government control over lower-level government fiscal policies. 
3.  The Pros and Cons of Policy Autonomy in a Federation 
Constitutional constraints, Federal legislation, and voluntary interstate agreements are 
alternative mechanisms that limit state government policymaking autonomy.  Such restrictions have 
potential advantages as well as potential disadvantages.  As discussed in the literature of fiscal 
federalism, decentralized policymaking in a federal system offers the potential for more efficient 
policy choices than those that would be chosen by “central planners” or higher-level governments.
4  
In brief, the potential economic advantages and disadvantages of fiscal decentralization are not 
dissimilar to those of economic decentralization in general.  Decentralized decisionmakers assess 
the benefits and costs of their actions in the light of the specialized information at their disposal, not 
necessarily available to higher-level decisionmaking units, and are motivated by the relatively 
narrowly focused interests to whom they are responsible rather than by a more diffuse 
responsibility to “society at large.”  When state and local government decisionmakers formulate 
fiscal and other policies, they are expected to be relatively highly attentive to the benefits and costs 
that those policies entail for the constituencies to which they are responsible, a focus that can lead 
to improved efficiency of decisionmaking from the viewpoint of society as a whole when the social 
benefits and costs of these policies are closely congruent with the benefits and costs to the residents 
of these states and localities.  Decentralized decisionmaking may be relatively inefficient, however, 
when lower-level decisions generate significant costs and benefits for the broader society.  In such 
cases, constraints on subnational government policy autonomy may enhance the overall efficiency 
                                                 
4 See Oates (1972) for a classic treatment. See Wildasin (2006, forthcoming) for concise and nontechnical discussions 
of some basic themes of fiscal federalism research as well as references to other works that survey some of the large 
and rapidly-growing literature in this field. 
  7of the federal system.  As a classic illustration, state government interference with the free flow of 
interstate commerce, prohibited by the Commerce clause, could damage the national “common 
market” within which households and firms carry out their economic activities.   
These basic considerations provide a framework for assessing the potential advantages and 
disadvantages of Federal statutory controls over state tax policies.  In cases where there is little 
reason to expect a state’s policies to produce important consequences beyond its boundaries, 
whether favorable or unfavorable, the fundamental rationale for Federal intervention is weak.  
When state policies produce significant external benefits or costs, on the other hand, corrective 
interventions may be useful.  Note, however, that corrective actions need not entail Federal pre-
emption of state taxes or, indeed, any Federal action at all.  Formal and informal cooperative 
agreements among states provide one way in which socially beneficial or harmful policies may be 
encouraged or discouraged without any Federal action at all.  These agreements may be viewed as 
the federalism equivalents of Coasian negotiations and bargaining to internalize externalities 
(Coase (1960)).   
Of course, as recognized by Coase, bargaining is a costly process, perhaps so much so that 
advantageous bargains sometimes cannot be struck.  For instance, an interstate agreement to 
simplify the administration of sales taxes by limiting the number of commodity categories subject 
to exemptions or other special treatment and by establishing shared definitions of the commodities 
that fall into these categories could ease administrative and enforcement burdens throughout an 
entire federation.  Arriving at such an agreement may be infeasible, however, if states haggle 
endlessly over fine distinctions of comparatively slight importance.  In such instances, Federal 
action may be needed to induce the states to adhere to a new and more efficient policy.   
  8Federal inducements to the states take several different forms.  Constitutional constraints 
are the most durable and inflexible of these.  Pre-emptive Federal statutes, though legally binding 
upon the states, can be amended or removed with much greater ease than constitutional constraints 
and can provide much more specific policy guidance than broad constitutional principles.  Federal 
fiscal inducements, such as intergovernmental transfers, offer still another means through which 
state government policymaking can be influenced.  Although intergovernmental transfers are not 
often viewed as mechanisms through which state tax policies are “regulated,” transfer programs 
certainly may affect the levels and types of taxes chosen by recipient governments.  In particular, 
formula-based grants that depend upon the “tax effort” or “tax capacity” of the recipient 
government create quite explicit incentives to alter tax policies.   
Federal statutory restrictions on state taxes thus are one mechanism among many through 
which imperfect decentralized tax policymaking by state governments can potentially be improved. 
Along a spectrum that ranges from the least-coercive mechanisms, notably voluntary interstate 
agreements, at one end, to the most powerful of all mechanisms, constitutional constraints, at the 
other end, pre-emptive Federal statutes occupy a middle ground.  In cases where state-level policy 
choices produce significant spillover effects but the costs of coordination among the states are high, 
statutes may help the states to realize policy outcomes that are socially preferred but not attainable 
through the operation of the “invisible hand” of purely decentralized policymaking.  Federal 
statutes can impose costs of their own, however, since they may produce policies that do not reflect 
the heterogeneous benefits and costs of policies in different states – the usual potential drawback 
associated with centralized policymaking.  For this reason, Federal pre-emption may be of greater 
value when it takes the form, as it typically does, of general procedural specifications (e.g., 
avoidance of double taxation, or general exemptions for classes of taxpayers) rather than detailed 
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5%).  The latter, highly detailed policy specifications would destroy important features of state 
fiscal policy autonomy and would limit interstate variation in policies in response to the unique 
assessments of benefits and costs in individual states.  Poorly-designed and overly-restrictive 
Federal statutes can do more harm than good. 
Constitutional constraints on state powers may also facilitate socially-preferred outcomes.  
However, the stakes are much higher in this context, since the Constitution is much more difficult 
to amend than Federal statutes.  The consequences of policy errors at the constitutional level are 
highly durable.  The same is true, though to a somewhat lesser degree, of judicial decisions based 
on constitutional interpretations.  In general, these can only be altered by explicit constitutional 
amendments or by the slow process of revision of judicial opinion through sequences of litigation 
that sometimes culminate in important new constitutional interpretations.  Constitutional 
constraints like the Commerce Clause provide durable commitments to fundamental principles and 
thus may be of immense value.  Constitutional provisions that provide (or are interpreted to 
provide) detailed policy specifications risk the loss of benefits from decentralized policymaking 
and the imposition of the costs associated with policy centralization in the same way as Federal 
statutes, only to a greater and more persistent degree. 
To summarize, then, Federal statutes may be most beneficial when they help states to solve 
coordination problems, enabling them to achieve desired policy outcomes that are not attainable 
either through completely decentralized policymaking or through voluntary cooperation among the 
states.   Such statutes limit the policy autonomy of states, however, and thus can interfere with the 
potential gains from decentralized policymaking.  The costs of Federal statutory constraints that 
prescribe state tax policies in highly specific detail are likely to be much greater than those that 
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response to ever-changing local conditions.  By comparison with statutory interventions, 
constitutional constraints and their judicial interpretations entail still greater departures from 
decentralized policy autonomy.   
These brief observations are intended merely to provide an overall perspective for the 
analysis of Federal pre-emption of state tax policy.  By no means do they provide a complete 
normative foundation for the formulation or evaluation of such pre-emptive statutes.  Rather, they 
are intended to convey some insights from the economics of fiscal federalism that can contribute to 
a better understanding not only of the normative foundations for Federal pre-emptions but of the 
use of such pre-emptions in practice.  Let us now consider some specific instances of such statutes. 
4. State Taxation of Consumption and Income 
This section discusses three important cases in which state taxing powers depend 
importantly on constitutional or legislative constraints.  The first case concerns state taxation of 
sales by out-of-state vendors to in-state purchasers.  The second case concerns the taxation of 
distributions from pensions and other forms of retirement savings under state personal income 
taxes.  The third case concerns state taxation of the income of out-of-state corporations.  In each 
case, Federal statutes with important consequences for state tax policy have been enacted or are 
under consideration.    
A.  Sales and Use Taxation 
Increased utilization of internet-based technologies for retail sales has focused new attention 
on state sales and use taxation.  The US Supreme Court, in Quill Corp. vs. North Dakota (1992), 
held that states could impose sales taxes only on vendors physically present within their 
jurisdictions.  This determination left states with the second-best alternative of relying on use taxes, 
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convenience of such transactions afforded by new technologies gives rise to the potential for 
substantial losses of sales tax revenues.  Some version of a “Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Act” 
(see McLure and Hellerstein (2004)) may offer the states an opportunity to tax sales more 
efficiently by providing explicit Congressional authorization for the imposition of state sales taxes 
on interstate transactions.  At present, a number of states have joined the Streamlined Sales and Use 
Tax Agreement (SSUTA), a multi-state compact that aims to establish a workable framework for 
the enforcement of sales taxes on remote vendors.  As of January 2007, fifteen states (with a 
combined population of about 57 million residents) were full members of this compact and another 
six (total population of 24 million) were associate members, a level of participation that indicates 
substantial but less-than-unanimous state interest in this initiative (NCSL 2007a).  Under the terms 
of this agreement, states establish low-cost administrative mechanisms through which taxes are 
collected on remote vendors at rates and with remittances corresponding the states in which 
purchasers are located, that is, on a destination basis.  
There are several potential benefits to the states from adherence to such an agreement.  
Perhaps of greatest interest to state policymakers, such cooperation might allow states to obtain 
additional revenues by taxing transactions that presently escape taxation.  From the viewpoint of 
policy evaluation, this is actually a somewhat secondary consideration, since the extra revenues 
could instead be obtained by raising tax rates on the existing sales and use tax bases or from other 
sources, just as any additional revenues that may be obtained from state cooperation in sales tax 
administration can be offset through the reverse of these actions.  More important, from a policy 
viewpoint, is the effect of such an initiative on the efficiency and distributional effects of state sales 
taxes.  The key potential benefit arises from avoidance of the distortions of economic behavior 
  12resulting from different effective rates of sales and use taxation.  At present, this effective tax 
differential (attributable to low rates of use-tax compliance) provides households and firms with 
fiscal incentives to shift transactions, otherwise subject to sales taxation, to forms that are subject to 
use taxes.  These fiscal incentives do not reflect underlying economic benefits and costs and thus 
produce economic inefficiencies.  In addition, in order to simplify compliance and administration 
of sales taxes, the SSUTA aims to establish convenient technologies that would allow vendors to 
apply and remit appropriate taxes on sales to dispersed purchasers, potentially reducing the costs of 
sales tax administration in general.  From a distributional viewpoint, successful implementation of 
a SSUTA would reduce the horizontal inequities that presently arise from differences in effective 
rates of sales and use taxes.   
The emergence of the SSUTA illustrates the interplay between different institutions in the 
US federation.  The Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Quill, dictates that state 
taxing powers are limited in important respects.  The states, through voluntary cooperation, may 
arrive at a mutual adjustment of their historically diverse sales tax regimes (including the local 
sales taxes that many states permit) which would facilitate the establishment of a nationwide sales 
tax administration mechanism that obviates the distortions arising from differentials in effective 
sales and use tax rates.  Congressional action would apparently be required to implement any such 
agreement, since it would authorize the states to enforce tax collections on transactions involving 
remote purchases.
5  Indeed, Congressional action could authorize state taxation of transactions 
involving remote vendors even in the absence of any such prior interstate agreement.  However, the 
search for sales tax simplifications agreeable to all or many states, as embodied in the current or 
                                                 
5 Rather than attempt to tax every transaction at the rate required by the destination jurisdiction, states could impose 
origin-based taxes on all transactions and then remit a portion of the revenues to other states, pursuant to a voluntary 
interstate compact (presumably based on reciprocity arrangements).  Such a tax might not violate any constitutional 
constraints, but many economists would prefer a system of destination-based sales taxes because they would more 
closely approximate a consumption tax.   
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that have figured prominently in Supreme Court decisions concerned with the burdens imposed by 
state taxes on interstate commerce.  Interestingly, proposed Congressional legislation -- e.g. the 
Sales Tax Fairness and Simplification Act (S.2152) and the Streamlined Sales Tax Simplification 
Act (S.2153), introduced in the 109
th Congress – would enable the implementation of the SSUTA 
provided that sufficiently many states enter into the agreement.  Such provisions in effect make the 
Congress into a “delegated enforcer” of state government policies, highlighting the role of 
Congress as a coordination mechanism for the states, as discussed in Section 3. 
It should be noted that the SSUTA by no means establishes an “economically satisfactory” 
sales tax regime, even if it does address some of the administrative problems that arise under 
current policy.  In particular, retails sales taxes are generally quite poor approximations to  
destination-based consumption taxes.  On the one hand, their tax bases are too inclusive, in that 
they tax many intermediate-goods transactions.  As Ring (1999) has shown, the states differ widely 
in the proportion of sales tax revenues derived from taxation of sales to consumers.  This figure is 
as high as 89% in West Virginia, but as low as 28% in Hawaii, averaging 59% for the nation as a 
whole.  (The wide interstate variation in this respect is one important indicator of the extent of state 
revenue autonomy, and also of the hurdles to be surmounted if states are to achieve significant 
“base harmonization,” a reform that would likely facilitate Congressional action in support of an 
initiative such as the SSUTA.)  For the nation as a whole, then, it appears that more than one-third 
of sales tax revenue derives from transactions that would not be taxed under a consumption tax. On 
the other hand, state sales tax bases are not inclusive enough, viewed from the perspective of 
consumption taxation.  Exemptions for food and clothing are widespread and well known.  Just as 
importantly, especially in an economy with a growing service sector, expenditures on health, 
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taxation.
6  (Business services should be exempt from retail sales taxes that are intended to tax 
consumption, since these services are intermediate inputs, not final consumption.)  For both of 
these reasons, retail sales taxes are far from ideal taxes from an efficiency perspective.  Indeed, as 
noted below, state personal income taxes may approximate a tax on final consumption better than 
existing retail sales taxes do.  
B. State Taxation of Pension Incomes 
As is well known, personal income taxes, as they are implemented in practice, are not taxes 
on true economic income.  Instead, they are “hybrids” of income taxes and consumption taxes.   A 
consumption tax differs from an income tax in that it taxes the uses of income, at the time that it is 
consumed, rather than the sources of income as it accrues.  Federal and state tax treatment of the 
income from retirement savings, capital gains, and other types of income produces a tax system that 
diverges substantially from a true income tax and that corresponds in important ways to a personal 
consumption tax.  In particular, when households elect to save a portion of their earnings using tax-
sheltered retirement savings in IRAs, 401(k)s, and other similar accounts, the return on their 
savings within these accounts is not subject to tax until the assets within the accounts are 
distributed upon retirement.  This means that the economic income arising from the return to capital 
in these accounts escapes taxation.  Similarly, employer contributions to employee pension plans as 
well as the return on these contributions are not subject to tax until they are distributed at 
retirement.  Since the proceeds of these distributions finance retirement consumption, the taxation 
of distributions from tax-sheltered savings and pension accounts effectively shifts the personal 
                                                 
6 Many personal services (lawn and garden care, laundry, personal grooming) avoid sales taxation but should of course 
be taxed as part of personal consumption.  The exemption of services complementary to the sale of taxed tangible 
goods – automobile repair, for instance --  creates incentives for tax avoidance through pricing distortions (reduced 
prices for taxable “parts” and increased prices for untaxed “labor”).  
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consumed, that is, to a consumption tax.  The taxation of capital gains on a realization basis offers 
similar opportunities for households to opt out of a tax on economic income and into a tax on 
consumption.  By electing to defer realization of capital gains until the proceeds from asset sales 
are needed in order to finance current spending, households are again able effectively to convert the 
“income” tax to a tax on consumption expenditures. 
These features of current Federal and state personal income tax systems do not result in true 
or “pure” personal consumption taxation, since there are limits on the amount of nonwage income 
that can be sheltered from taxation as it accrues.  Furthermore, early distributions from sheltered 
accounts are often subject to penalties, making them unattractive instruments for non-retirement 
savings.  Consequently, a significant amount of nonwage income is taxed as it accrues, and to this 
extent the personal income tax diverges from a consumption tax and more closely approximates a 
true income tax.  Existing Federal and state income taxes are thus “hybrids” of income and 
consumption taxes.   
The interstate mobility of households over the life cycle adds an interesting aspect to the 
question of consumption taxation at the state level.  Suppose that a household earns wage income 
when residing and working in one state, say state A, directing a portion of this income into tax-
sheltered retirement savings accounts.  Suppose that the household moves to a different state B 
upon retirement and then receives distributions from its retirement savings accounts.  This 
household’s life-cycle consumption is now spread across two states.  Assuming that both states 
impose taxes on personal income, the question arises as to whether distributions from retirement 
accounts “should” be taxed in A or B.  If these distributions are taxed by state A, then its personal 
income tax base is the lifetime consumption of households who reside and earn wages there early in 
  16the life cycle.  If retirement distributions are taxed in state B instead, then state A’s personal 
income tax allows it to tax consumption early in the household’s life cycle while state B’s personal 
income tax base includes the household’s retirement consumption expenditures.  These two 
alternatives may be referred to as “source based” and “residence based” taxation of distributions 
from sheltered accounts, and they result in source based and residence based consumption taxation, 
respectively.
7    
Needless to say, this simple illustrative example abstracts from many nontrivial 
complications, including the possibility that households may reside in several different states at 
different stages of the life cycle and may face graduated and time-varying income tax rates in 
different states.   It serves, however, to show that the tax treatment of retirement distributions on a 
source or destination basis has important implications for state personal income taxation.  Both 
types of taxation have some economic virtues.  Source-based taxation allows states (state A in the 
example) to tax a household’s lifetime consumption if it earns wage income there when young and 
takes advantage of opportunities to shelter a portion of this income from current income taxation.  
State-level taxes on lifetime consumption may be viewed as desirable on equity grounds, and, if so, 
the principle of horizontal equity might be interpreted to require that lifetime tax burdens be fixed 
independently of the state in which consumption occurs.  Under this principle, residence-based 
taxation would be undesirable because it would result in unequal lifetime state income tax burdens 
for households that remain in one state for their entire lifetimes as compared with other households 
that relocate at some point in the life cycle, thereby exiting the personal income tax system of the 
previous state(s) of residence and entering the system of their new state(s) of residence.  The 
                                                 
7 Of course, it is possible that both states could try to tax retirement distributions, resulting in double taxation.  A 
possible solution to the double taxation problem would be for states to offer credits for taxes paid to other states, as in 
fact was generally the case prior to the passage of  PL104-85, which has obviated the issue.  
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based consumption taxation appears to be quite problematic, however, when applied to households 
who reside in several different states during the pre-retirement portion of the life cycle.   
Destination-based consumption taxation might be preferable to source-based taxation on 
efficiency grounds, insofar as households (including retirees) impose public-service provision costs 
on the states where they reside.  Location-contingent taxes, such as a destination-based 
consumption tax, can enhance locational efficiency by serving as indirect congestion tolls when 
governments provide congestible public goods.
8   
PL 104-85, passed in 1996, has decided this issue of state taxation in favor of the residence 
principle.  Prior to the passage of this law, states had the option of imposing income taxes on 
distributions from the retirement accounts of former residents and some sixteen states did so, at 
least in principle.
9  By declaring that states may only tax such distributions on a residence basis, 
this statute has clarified how states may exercise some of their taxing powers, obviating potential 
constitutional and other legal disputes regarding double taxation and nexus.  It also obviates the 
difficult administrative issues that arise, under the source principle, for individuals who reside in 
multiple states during their working lifetimes.  By settling on the residence principle, the statute 
equips states that attract older residents with an important policy instrument with which to finance 
the public services that these households demand, even as it limits the ability of states to impose 
                                                 
8 In general, neither a residence-based nor a source-based consumption tax is a perfect congestion toll.  If the cost of 
public service provision is highly dependent on the level of employment within a state, employment-based taxes like a 
source-based consumption tax or taxes on earnings or payrolls might be preferable to residence-based consumption 
taxes or possibly retail sales taxes.  Many public services, however, depend principally on the size of the population 
being served rather than on the level of employment, in which case a residence-based consumption tax is likely to be a 
better implicit congestion toll.  This is especially true for congestible public services consumed disproportionately by 
the elderly, such as nursing home care.  
  
9 See the report of the House Committee on the Judiciary (1995) for discussion of the policy background of PL104-85.  
The report notes (p. 3) that “One State in particular, California, … aggressively sought to tax annuity payments made to 
retirees who have moved elsewhere.”  “Elsewhere”, in this context, includes Nevada, a state with no income tax – a 
problematic situation from the viewpoint of source-based consumption taxation but quite acceptable from the residence 
perspective.  
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rapidly aging population and growing amounts of wealth held in tax sheltered accounts.  The 
availability of this tax instrument permits states to shift the burden of government finance to the 
elderly, if desired.  Competition for older workers under these circumstances may result in state 
expenditure, regulatory, and other policies that are more favorable to older residents with 
significant amounts of accumulated tax-sheltered savings.  
C. Corporation Income Taxation 
In 1959, the Supreme Court (Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota) 
determined that a state could impose income taxes on a corporation if it solicited sales there, 
irrespective of whether it engaged in any production activities, owned any property, or employed 
workers in the state.  Within months, Congress passed PL 86-272, which prohibits a state from 
levying such taxes on a corporation if it is only involved in the solicitation of sales for tangible 
products within the state and if such sales are filled by deliveries from outside the state.  This law 
thus allows a corporation to sell its tangible products in a state without exposure to the state’s 
corporation income tax.   
PL 86-272 implies a significant restriction on state taxing powers, all the more so as states 
have moved toward reliance on apportionment rules in which sales are the main determinant of the 
taxable share of corporate income.  The fact that the statute mentions only tangible products 
presents a special complication, as it leaves open the possibility that states can tax the incomes of 
corporations that derive revenues from intangibles, such as royalties, even if they have no physical 
connection with the state.  Indeed, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has specifically ruled that 
such taxes are permissible (Geoffrey Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission (1993)).  The 
economic consequences of this asymmetric treatment of tangibles and intangibles are potentially 
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(2000, 2002), McLure and Hellerstein (2004), and references therein for further discussion).  What 
is of particular interest for present purposes is the role of a pre-emptive Federal statute. In this case, 
as in the sales tax case, a Supreme Court ruling had an important impact on state taxing powers.  
Whereas the Supreme Court imposed significant limitations on state sales taxation in Quill, it 
offered a seemingly expansive interpretation of state powers to tax corporation income in 
Northwestern States.  In the latter case, Congress acted swiftly to exercise its own powers to 
regulate interstate commerce by enacting PL 86-272 and thus removing the taxing powers that the 
states were held by the Supreme Court to possess.  Because this law referred specifically to tangible 
products, the current status of state taxing powers with respect to income derived from intangibles 
is open to dispute.   
This matter could be clarified by further Supreme Court rulings, although such rulings could 
presumably be superseded by additional congressional action as happened in 1959 after the ruling 
on Northwestern States.  Indeed, new legislation need not await further court rulings.  As an 
example, the Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2003 (BATS) (McLure and Hellerstein 
(2004)) would have further restricted state taxing powers by limiting state corporation income taxes 
only to corporations that are physically present within their boundaries.  Logically, legislation 
along these lines may be seen as a natural complement to PL 86-272: if revenues derived from the 
sale of tangible products do not alone make a corporation’s income subject to tax within a state, it 
is seems anomalous for it to be taxable solely because it derives revenues from intangibles.  On the 
other hand, logical consistency would also be served by the repeal of PL 86-272, so that states 
could tax the incomes of all corporations that derive revenues from any sources at all, whether 
  20tangible or intangible.  The scope of state corporation income taxation depends heavily on the 
resolution of these issues. 
5. Conclusion 
As is clear from the illustrative cases discussed in Section 4, Federal statutes can have major 
impacts on state taxation.  Sales, personal income, and corporation income taxes are three of the 
most important components of state tax structures.  The ability of the states to utilize each of these 
taxes has been affected (or may soon be affected) in major ways by existing or proposed Federal 
statutes.  Federal pre-emption is, however, only one part of the institutional structure within which 
state tax systems must operate.   Important court decisions have in some cases expanded and in 
some cases have restrained the scope of state taxing powers.  In some instances, court decisions 
have triggered contrary Federal legislative action (PL86-272) while in other cases Congress has 
been willing to accept the impact of judicial rulings (Quill).  Perhaps stimulated in some cases by 
judicial rulings and, in others, by Congressional inaction, states occasionally undertake important 
tax coordination initiatives on their own, as illustrated by the Multistate Tax Compact and the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement.  Thus, the Constitution (as interpreted by the courts), 
Federal legislation, interstate cooperative efforts, and independent state action interact continuously 
against the backdrop of economic and technological change to determine how state governments 
are financed.   This is a very complex dynamic institutional process and, for students of federalism, 
a deeply interesting one. 
Within this institutional context, Federal statutes occupy a kind of middle ground.  They 
control the taxing powers of the states with the force of law and, once enacted, their impact on the 
states is inescapable.  Unlike constitutional constraints, however, these statutes can in principle be 
altered comparatively easily should circumstances arise in which Congress would wish to do so,  
  21and new statutes can be implemented with far greater ease than amendments to the constitution or, 
perhaps, revisions of judicial doctrines of constitutional interpretation.  (The fact that PL86-272 has 
not been revised in nearly a half century attests to the fact that Federal statutes may nonetheless  be 
very durable.)  On the other hand, Federal legislation is much less flexible than cooperative 
agreements among the states, which can be altered without Congressional action and to which state 
adherence is discretionary.  Voluntary compacts thus impose comparatively modest constraints on 
state tax policy.  Such compacts would appear to be most useful to the states when they must deal 
with particularly complex problems under rapidly changing circumstances, that is, when the 
commitment to a rigidly-fixed policy entails a high risk of policy error.   
The literature of fiscal federalism has identified some of the important advantages and 
disadvantages of decentralized government policymaking in a federation.  Federal statutory 
controls over state policymaking provide one means by which some of the disadvantages of 
decentralization may be avoided or minimized without undermining its advantages.  Further 
detailed analysis of the benefits and costs of specific statutes, such as those described in Section 4, 
would be of great interest from the viewpoint of normative policy evaluation.  An equally 
interesting challenge for future research is to understand why and under what conditions Congress 
elects to intervene in state tax policy matters and when it instead steps into the background, 
allowing other institutions – the states themselves, acting independently or cooperatively, as well as 
the Constitution, as interpreted by the courts – to play more decisive roles.  Many contributions to 
the literature of fiscal federalism offer potential insight into this issue but, to the author’s 
knowledge, it has not so far been the subject of systematic analysis by economists.  Further 
investigation of this topic can shed important light on the development of policy in a complex and 
dynamic institutional context. 
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